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Crime Scars:  
Recessions and the Making of Career Criminals 
 
Abstract 
Recessions lead to short-term job loss, lower happiness and decreasing income levels. There is 
growing evidence that workers who first join the labor market during economic downturns 
suffer from poor job matches that can have sustained detrimental effects on wages and career 
progressions. This paper uses US and UK data to document a more disturbing long-run effect 
of recessions: young people who leave school during recessions are significantly more likely 
to lead a life of crime than those entering a buoyant labor market. Thus, crime scars resulting 
from higher entry level unemployment rates prove to be long lasting and substantial. 
 
Keywords: Crime; Recessions; Unemployment. 
JEL Classifications: J64; K42. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank the Editor, anonymous referees and participants in numerous seminar 
and conference presentations of earlier versions of this paper for many helpful comments and 
suggestions. We are grateful to Kory Kantenga for research assistance. The research was 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council at the Centre for Economic Performance. 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Do the labor market conditions the young encounter when first leaving school play a role in 
initiating and forming criminal careers? Think of two otherwise identical school leavers who 
left high school in 2010 – one in North Dakota, the other in Michigan. Both have completed 
education and try to get a job. But the North Dakota school leaver faced a state unemployment 
rate of only 3.8 percent, while it was 12.7 percent in Michigan. At the margin, the Michigan 
youngster is more likely to proceed down the wrong path – no luck getting a job, no welfare to 
fall back on, hanging out with similarly unfortunate juveniles, trouble with the police, some 
petty larceny and so on – than the North Dakota youngster. Indeed this is just the standard 
Becker (1968) model in action. As youths leave school, they face a trade-off between legal and 
illegal activities. At higher unemployment rates, the expected returns to legal activity (i.e. 
work) are lower. All else equal, this encourages some youths to commit crime who would 
otherwise have avoided such a result in a more buoyant labor market.  
But what might happen as these same youngsters age? Two obvious mechanisms link 
their experience straight out of high school with later ones. First, earlier experiences of crime 
can increase their stock of criminal knowledge and potentially reduce the costs of subsequent 
crime participation. Second, a previous criminal record (and less on-the-job human capital 
accumulation) may reduce the expected wage in the legal labor market. Both can be expected 
to increase the likelihood that the individual eventually ends up becoming a career criminal. 
There is a substantial body of criminological evidence that points to the importance of 
the experience of youths for understanding crime patterns. Almost two hundred years ago, 
Adolphe Quetelet showed that crime in early nineteenth-century France peaked when 
individuals were in their late teens (Quetelet, 1831). Subsequent research has confirmed the 
strong age-crime pattern, with crime peaking in the late teens and declining with age quite 
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rapidly.1 Unsurprisingly in our data, the same patterns emerge.2 The peak is at age 17 or 18 and 
then declines reasonably smoothly. However, it is still the case that the offender rate at age 29 
is a lot higher than at age 39 – showing criminality to be not just a feature of teenage years.  
Existing evidence also points to strong links between criminality in teenage years and 
subsequent criminal behavior.3 In our data for example, 72 percent of males aged over 25 in 
the UK who were convicted of a crime in 2002 had a criminal record that went back to their 
teenage years. Thus, factors that increase criminal behavior for juveniles have scope to raise 
the lifetime criminal participation rate. The focus of this paper is whether the state of the labor 
market at entry is such a factor. 
In pursuing this research question, our analysis contributes to two distinct strands of 
literature. First, there has been an extensive, though partly unresolved, debate over the link 
between recessions and crime, studying whether crime rates, and in particular property crime 
                                                
1 See Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) for the development of the formulation that crime-age 
profiles are invariant over time and space, and the subsequent body of research trying to refute 
this claim that followed (for example, Greenberg, 1985, Hansen, 2003, and the meta-study of 
Pratt and Cullen, 2000). 
2 Figure A1 in the Appendix plots the average male offender rate by age for the US and UK 
from 2000-2010. Full details on the data used in the chart are provided in Section 4 and the 
Data Appendix. The chart shows the average offender rate (arrested in US and convicted in 
UK), defined as the number of offenders in each age group divided by population in each age 
group. The data is averaged over the period 2000-2010. 
3 See the many papers cited in the review of Nagin and Paternoster (2000) which frames the 
positive link at the individual level between past and future criminality in terms of individual 
heterogeneity and state dependence. 
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rates, are countercyclical. The place where one can identify effects of unemployment on crime 
is for young adults. 4  Thus, Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002) examine the impact of 
contemporaneous unemployment and wages on the criminal behavior of less educated young 
males. Exploiting a panel of US counties, they find significant effects for both wages and 
unemployment on property and violent crime. Fougère et al. (2009) find strong effects from 
youth unemployment (but not overall unemployment) on crime in France, while Grönqvist 
(2013) uses Swedish register data to uncover a strong and precisely estimated link between 
youth unemployment and crime, both for property and violent crimes.  
Second, there is a growing literature on the effects of first entering the labor market 
during recessions on outcomes later in life. That literature so far has focused on whether such 
workers experience sustained long-run negative consequences. Early contributions by Ellwood 
(1982) and Gardecki and Neumark (1998) found somewhat contrasting evidence on whether 
initial labor market experience affected subsequent outcomes, with Ellwood finding significant 
effects on wages but not on future spells of unemployment, while Gardecki and Neumark found 
little evidence of a sustained negative effect. More recently, Hershbein (2012) finds that a 
recession reduces starting wages of high-school graduates by about 6 percent, but that this 
penalty fades away within six years. Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012) exploit a large 
Canadian longitudinal dataset to show that the cost of a recession for new graduates is 
substantial and long lasting. A typical recession – a 5 percentage point rise in the 
unemployment rate – is associated with an initial loss of earnings of about 9 percent that halves 
                                                
4 Indeed, Freeman’s (1999) survey notes the relationship across the whole population to be 
‘fragile, at best’. More recent reviews confirm this and therefore more focus can be placed on 
youth crime and unemployment to see labor market effects on crime (for example, see Mustard, 
2010, and Buonnano et al., 2011). 
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within 5 years, and finally fades to zero by 10 years. The economic mechanism operates via 
initial placements with lower paying employers and succeeding recoveries through gradual job 
mobility to better firms. Graduates in the lower quintile of the ability distribution suffer 
permanently lower wages, while the more able graduates quickly bounce back. Similar results 
are reported by Kahn (2010) who uses longitudinal data on US college graduates, though some 
of her results suggest that the wage penalty is longer lasting. By contrast, Benedetto, Gathright 
and Stinson (2010) find no evidence of a persistent impact of graduation-year unemployment 
on earnings using US social security earnings data.5  
Taking a somewhat different approach, Oyer (2006, 2008) has examined the career paths 
of particular occupations, namely economists and investment bankers, to assess the importance 
of initial conditions. He shows that stock market conditions at the time of graduation have a 
strong effect on whether MBA students go directly to Wall Street, or instead pursue alternatives 
such as jobs in consulting firms. Further, he shows that starting a career in investment banking 
directly after graduation causes a person to be more likely to stay in the job and earn 
significantly more. These effects are substantial in size, amounting to several million dollars in 
terms of present value. 
Outside of the labor market literature, labor market entry conditions have been shown to 
impact other outcomes. MacLean (2013), for example, finds that males who graduate from high 
school during a recession show worse health outcomes at age forty than those graduating in a 
better labor market. This is true for both self-reported health measures and objective measures 
of physical and mental health. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that those who enter the 
labor market in recession are more likely to believe that success in life depends more on luck 
                                                
5  See also the international comparison of unemployment entry effects on labor market 
outcomes in the US and Japan by Genda et al. (2010). 
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than effort and support more government redistribution. Again, these effects are seen to be long 
lasting. The protective effect of education for cohorts who graduate in recessions is studied by 
Cutler et al. (2014) in their analysis of Eurobarometer data. They report evidence of lower 
wages and life satisfaction together with higher obesity and a greater propensity to smoke and 
drink later in life for individuals who graduate in recession years, with higher education levels 
significantly moderating these negative outcomes. 
Our results uncover a more disturbing long-run effect of recessions. Based on a variety 
of individual and cohort level data for men aged up to 39 from the US and the UK, we report 
evidence of a systematic empirical link between crime and entry-level unemployment that very 
clearly shows young people who leave school in the midst of recessions are significantly more 
likely to lead a life of crime than those entering a buoyant labor market. Thus, as other 
economic and social outcomes are significantly affected by the state of the business cycle at 
the time when individuals potentially enter the labor market, so is criminal activity. We 
conclude that recessions do play a role in the making of career criminals, as crime scars from 
higher entry level unemployment rates are both long lasting and substantial. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss possible 
links between initial conditions at labor market entry and the future path of criminal behavior 
as well as the underlying dynamics to motivate our empirical research. In Section 3, we discuss 
the empirical strategy. We present the cohort panel results and individual-level evidence in 
Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
In the standard Becker (1968) economics of crime model, individuals act as rational decision 
makers and choose between legal and illegal activity. Their choice is based on the expected 
returns to both options. In this simple yet powerful framework, returns to legal activity are 
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solely determined by the market earnings from employment whereas returns to illegal activity 
take into account the potential crime payoff, the probability of getting caught and the expected 
sanction if caught. If the expected return to illegal activity outweighs the expected return to 
legal activity, the individual chooses to commit crime. In the Becker model, higher 
unemployment reduces the returns to legal activity. Thus, individuals facing unemployment or 
higher risk of unemployment may become more likely to commit crime than they would have 
been otherwise. That effect is expected to be higher for young people who typically are less 
attached to the legal labor market than older individuals further on in their careers. 
The model has proved valuable in highlighting the economic incentives associated with 
criminal activity and its basic predictions on incentive and deterrence effects on crime have 
received substantial empirical support (see the reviews of Draca and Machin, 2015, Freeman, 
1999, and Chalfin and McCrary, 2017). Its weakness and limitation for our purposes is that it 
is explicitly static. Individuals make a one-off decision to commit crime or work in the legal 
sector. There is no process through which decisions made in the current period have 
implications both for future decisions and for the choices available to the individual in later 
periods.  
 Mocan et al. (2005) develop a dynamic model that links recessions, human capital and 
crime.6 Individuals are lifetime utility maximizers with income coming from the legal and the 
criminal sector. Individuals have endowments of legal and criminal human capital, which 
depreciate over time. Both types of human capital rise with experience in the sector and are 
increased by investment in the respective sectors. The individual’s income is a function of 
human capital and rates of return in both sectors. In each period, the individual solves a 
                                                
6 Other dynamic crime participation models include Flinn (1986) and Lochner (2004). 
7 
 
dynamic stochastic optimization problem. First, they decide how much time to allocate to legal 
and criminal work and second, they decide on the optimal level of consumption. 
Crime is risky since a criminal faces a certain probability of being caught and sent to 
prison (or being punished otherwise). The probability of prison depends on the skill of the 
criminal as measured by criminal human capital and the amount of time spent in the criminal 
sector. While legal human capital may decline in prison in addition to depreciation effects, for 
example due to reputation effects, criminal human capital may increase if criminals in prison 
learn from each other. 
In this model, recessions impact on crime through the respective dynamic evolutions of 
legal and criminal human capital. In that sense, the long-term impact of recessions on crime 
differs with the length and the depth of a recession. In a recession, the returns to legal human 
capital fall. Following the arguments from the standard Becker (1968) model, involvement in 
criminal activity rises depending on the relative and absolute returns to crime. If involvement 
in criminal activity increases, the criminal human capital stock is expected to grow while the 
legal human capital stock depreciates. Once the recession ends, returns to legal human capital 
increase again, and the relative returns to criminal activity decrease. In a short recession, the 
stock of legal human capital typically remains significantly higher than the stock of criminal 
human capital, and the individual exits the criminal sector. Basically, in such a short recession, 
the individual is encouraged to get involved in criminal activity, but is not exposed to these 
conditions for a long enough period to develop sufficient criminal capital in order to yield 
higher returns in the crime market than in the legal market once the recession ends.  
If an individual is exposed to an unexpectedly long recession, the decision between legal 
and illegal activity changes in the same way as in a short recession. However, the individual’s 
criminal human capital stock grows over a longer time period whereas the legal human capital 
stock is expected to decline even more than in a shorter recession. These two effects may result 
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in higher returns to criminal activity than to legal activity even after the recession ends. We 
expect more permanent effects of a recession on criminal behavior in that case. In addition, 
with higher involvement in criminal activity, the chances of being caught and imprisoned will 
rise. As explained above, if imprisoned, an individual’s criminal human capital stock may rise 
further in absolute terms, and certainly rises further relative to legal human capital. In that 
situation hysteresis can occur and trigger criminal careers. 
The mechanisms explained above are likely to be stronger for these individuals with 
initially low levels of legal human capital. New entrants to the labor market have developed 
less legal human capital and are less attached to the legal labor market. In our empirical 
analysis, we study cohorts entering the labor market in different economic conditions and 
estimate the effect of entering the labor market in a recession on subsequent crime outcomes. 
In the criminology literature there has been extensive focus on the concept of a criminal 
career and how it develops with age (see Piquero et al., 2003). A criminal career is often 
characterized by various stages: onset, persistence, escalation/specialization and desistance. 
Sampson and Laub (1993, 2005) characterize crime as a product of persistent individual 
differences and local life events. They find that incarceration in later life is strongly related to 
the difficulty in securing stable work as individuals entered young adulthood.  
Our research question of whether labor market entry conditions matter for crime fits 
naturally into this framework. Unemployment at labor market entry (a local life event) can 
contribute to the onset of criminal behavior and/or can encourage the persistence of those 
youths that have already begun a criminal career. The long-run effect of unemployment at labor 
market entry then depends on the persistence and desistance effects. There has been less 
research on the duration of criminal careers. One study (Piquero et al., 2003) finds that, for 
offenders with two or more offences, the average duration of criminal careers was 10.4 years. 
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In the discussion thus far we have implicitly assumed that unemployment at labor market 
entry causes the criminal career to begin at that point (or to intensify for those youths already 
active in crime). A complementary alternative would be that entry unemployment could have 
delayed effects on criminal behavior. Zara and Farrington (2010) study a group of late-onset 
offenders (those who commit their first crime aged 21 or over). They find a significant effect 
of high unemployment at age 16-18 as a predictor of subsequent offending (relative to a non-
offending control group). To address this in our empirical analysis, we consider an approach 
that is flexible enough to permit differential timing of the effects of labor market entry 
unemployment effects on crime. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy  
Our empirical analysis exploits both panel data on year-of-birth cohorts over space and time 
and individual data for the US and the UK. The data are discussed in more detail in the 
following sections as well as in the Data Appendix.  
For the panel data, we observe age/birth cohorts as they enter the labor market and follow 
them through their (potential) working lives up to age 39. Our unit of analysis is defined at the 
year-of-birth cohort (c), region (r), and calendar year (t) level where region refers to states in 
the US and to standard regions in the UK. We can estimate the long-run effect of initial labor 
market conditions by exploiting the regional variation in entry unemployment rates across 
cohorts using the following equation: log(C)crt	=	αc	+	αr	+	αt	+	αa	+	βUcr,0	+	γXcrt	+	εcrt (1) 
In (1), the dependent variable is the log crime rate for the cohort, region and time cell and we 
include fixed effects αc, αr, αt and αa for cohort, region, time and age. X is a set of control 
variables (defined below) and ε is an error term. Labor market entry occurs at date 0, so Ucr,0 
denotes the cohort-region specific unemployment rate at that date. 
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The first pertinent feature of equation (1) is that (in common with a number of other 
applications when cohort data of different ages is followed over time) it is well known that one 
cannot separately identify age, cohort and time effects. We follow the standard approach of 
including a full-set of age, cohort and time fixed effects and arbitrarily dropping one additional 
cohort effect.7 Secondly, in order to adjust for cohort compositional differences, we include the 
X set of covariates at the level of our unit of analysis. In particular, we adjust for the average 
share of immigrants, male graduates, black males, married males and females per cohort in the 
region over the sample period.8 
The baseline model in (1) is restrictive in that it assumes that subsequent unemployment 
rates experienced by the cohort have no effect on their criminal behavior. In effect, the model 
allows us to estimate the average effect of entering the labor market in a recession on crime 
over the life-cycle, given the usual pattern of regional unemployment that cohorts experience 
after entry. For the focus of this paper, we are arguably more interested in the effect of entry 
unemployment net of subsequent labor market conditions. To isolate this effect, we can include 
regional unemployment rates experienced by the cohort in the years after labor market entry. 
We measures these as Ucr,i, where i > 0 is the number of years since entry. This gives us a 
second, more general model to estimate: 
                                                
7 We could alternatively have required the cohort-effects to sum to zero (Deaton, 1997), and 
our results prove to be robust to this alternative. 
8 The specific control variables included are to account for demographic correlates of crime 
and for changing patterns of immigration (for examples of papers studying directly the 
connections between crime and immigration see Bell et al., 2013, Bianchi et al., 2012, and 
Mastrobuoni and Pinotti, 2015). 
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log(C)crt	=	αc	+	αr	+	αt	+	αa	+	βUcr,0	+ δiUcr,iIi=1 		+	γXcrt	+	εcrt (2) 
 
where i can theoretically take any value up to the latest year observed since labor market entry 
(for example, when t = 0 corresponds to age 16, it could run from 1 to 23 years subsequent to 
entry up to our maximum age of 39). A fully saturated unemployment rate model would allow 
the unemployment rate the cohort experienced in every year of their labor market experience 
to affect their crime rate. However, we restrict the coefficients on the i-dated unemployment 
rates to affect the cohort crime rate only when the cohort reaches that point in the life-cycle. 
For example, the coefficient on regional unemployment five years after the cohort enters the 
labor market is restricted to be zero until the cohort actually reaches five years of experience. 
This ensures that future unemployment rates cannot affect current crime, which is intuitively 
sensible.  
Next, we introduce dynamics by further generalizing equations (1) and (2) to permit the 
main coefficient of interest on the initial unemployment rate, β, to vary with labor market 
experience/years since assumed labor market entry.9 This enables us to see to what extent the 
average effect of entry unemployment on a cohort occurs because of early scarring effects that 
erode as time since labor market entry increases or because of more persistent effects:  
log(C)crt	=	αc	+	αr	+	αt	+	αa	+	 βeEe=1 [I(Exp=e)*Ucr,0]	+	γXcrt	+	εcrt (3) 
 
                                                
9 Potential experience here is years since labor market entry (i.e. age - [age at year t = 0], with 
t = 0 being the assumed labor market entry age as defined below) so the notation of the 
age/experience fixed effect in the estimating equations can be interchangeably used as either 
αa or αe. 
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This specification allows β to vary with potential labor market experience (Exp, for experience 
groups e = 1,..,E) to measure the extent to which any effect of initial unemployment on criminal 
behavior persists with length of time since labor market entry. 
Our final and most general estimating equation further allows for the unemployment 
experienced after labor market entry to have permanent or transitory effects: 
log(C)crt	=	αc	+	αr	+	αt	+	αa	+	 βeEe=1 [I(Exp=e)*Ucr,0]	+ 
δieEe=1 [I(Exp=e)*Ucr,i]	Ii=1 +	γXcrt	+	εcrt 
 
(4) 
In (4) both the b’s and the d’s are allowed to depend on the length of time that passes since the 
entry and subsequent unemployment rate were experienced by the cohort. Again, the effects of 
subsequent unemployment are restricted to be zero until the cohort reaches the relevant age. 
It is important to be clear that identification comes from within-cohort variation in entry 
unemployment rates across states/regions. We view this as the most convincing approach that 
can be taken with the available data and this therefore forms the basis of most of our results. 
However it could be argued that removing the aggregate national unemployment rate at entry 
(which follows from including cohort fixed effects) removes much of the variation over time. 
To address this, we also report specifications using the national unemployment rate at labor 
market entry, including a quadratic cohort trend to account for changing cohort quality.  
For the micro-level data we observe cross-sections of individuals and can identify those 
who are incarcerated (in the US data) and those who report having ever been arrested (in the 
UK data). For each individual, we can match the unemployment rate at the time of labor market 
entry by area of residence and estimate probability models to explore the effect on criminal 
outcomes in later life. 
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4. Cohort Panel Evidence 
Details of US Panel Data  
For the US panel analysis, our measure of criminality is arrests. Use of arrests data is 
driven by two considerations. First, consistent annual incarceration data at the state and cohort 
level simply do not exist in the United States (see Pfaff, 2011). Second, it is of interest to 
measure criminality in a broad way to check that the results are robust. We therefore use arrest 
data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR reports the number of arrests by 
year, state, age, gender and crime type. Our sample runs from 1980 to 2010.  
We obtain the number of arrests for property and violent crimes by respectively 
aggregating arrests over crime types. Our measure for property crime includes arrests for 
burglary, larceny, vehicle theft and arson, while our measure for violent crime includes arrests 
for murder, rape, robbery and assault. We produce arrest rates by dividing the number of arrests 
by the annual population in the observational unit, and scale by 1,000. Population data is 
retrieved from the US Census population estimates.  
The sample covers males aged between 16 and 39, the group of individuals with the 
highest crime propensity. The original data are grouped by age. Up to the age of 24 the data 
are reported by single age year, while for ages 25 and above the data are grouped in five-year 
age bands (25-29, 30-34, 35-39). As our empirical strategy exploits year-of-birth cohorts, we 
assume that year-of-birth cohorts within these older age groups of 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 are 
homogeneous in terms of arrest rates. We then construct the number of arrests for single-year-
of-birth cohorts within these age groups by dividing the number of arrests by five. Our sample 
14 
 
comprises year-of-birth cohorts that run from 1941 to 1994.10 Assuming that individuals enter 
the labor market at age 16, labor market entry would therefore occur from 1957 to 2010. We 
have data on state annual insured unemployment rates from 1957 until 2010.11  
Since data for some states are systematically missing, we exclude these states from our 
analysis.12 States with missing data for a limited number of years only are included for the non-
missing years, leading to an unbalanced panel.13 There is however no evidence to suggest that 
the states that do not report data differ significantly in terms of entry unemployment rates. We 
also exclude state-year observations that cover arrests for less than 95 percent of the state 
population in that year.  
Two conceptual issues arise with these data. First, since we link the current arrest rate for 
a particular cohort in a given state to the entry unemployment rate of that cohort in the same 
                                                
10 Our first year of data on arrests is 1980 and the oldest age we consider is 39, so this cohort 
was born in 1941. Similarly, our data ends in 2010 and the youngest age is 16 (i.e. the 1994 
birth-cohort). 
11 The downside of using that kind of data is that it does not allow us to distinguish between 
total and youth unemployment rates at labor market entry, nor provide measures of the duration 
of unemployment. 
12 As described in the Data Appendix in more detail, excluded states are: Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South 
Dakota, and Washington. As an example, New York is excluded since New York City 
(specifically the NYPD) systematically does not report arrests, and thus arrest data at state level 
would be heavily undercounted.  
13 For example, Florida does report arrests until 1995, but not afterwards. Thus, we include 
Florida in our sample until 1995.  
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state, we assume cohorts do not substantially move across states over time. So for example, we 
assume that the criminal behavior of the 30 year-old cohort in California in the year 2000 is 
affected by the unemployment rate in California in the year 1986, when that cohort entered the 
labor market. The empirical validity of this relies on no inter-state mobility since school-
leaving age. If there is mobility but it is random since school exit, the estimates will merely be 
noisy. But, if mobility is driven by self-selection, the coefficient of interest may be biased. 
Following Dahl (2002), below we present robustness tests based on mobility corrections from 
the US Census.  
Second, in our empirical work for the US we use the average unemployment rate that the 
cohort experienced at ages 16 to 18 as our measure of entry unemployment. This is motivated 
by the observation that the majority of arrested criminals has low educational attainment and 
generally do leave school at or around the compulsory school leaving age. In the US Census 
data that we use in our microdata analysis, 86 percent of those incarcerated over the 1980-2010 
sample had high school or less (<=12 years of education) as their highest level of education. 
Since school-leaving ages differ slightly across time and states, and unemployment within a 
cohort/state observation is autocorrelated, we use the 16 to 18 average unemployment rate to 
characterize the state of the labor market that the cohort first experiences. An alternative would 
be to use the age 16 (or indeed age 17 or 18) unemployment rate only. We show below that our 
results are robust to these alternative approaches to defining entry unemployment. 
Details of UK Panel Data  
Crime data for the UK panel come from the Offenders Index Database (OID) and the 
Police National Computer (PNC). The measure of crime is convictions. This has the advantage 
of capturing actual offenders (subject of course to wrongful conviction) rather than the 
proportion of a particular cohort that come into contact with the police. The OID/PNC provides 
data on gender, date of birth, region of conviction and offence category. This data sample again 
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runs from 1980 to 2010. Our variable construction matches that of the US panel. However, in 
contrast to the US, there is a standard national school-leaving age in the UK. For those leaving 
school by 1972, the compulsory school leaving-age was 15, and 16 from 1973 onward. We use 
this compulsory age to date labor market entry for each cohort, rather than taking the 16 to 18 
average. However, results are reported that again show that our conclusions are robust to this 
alternative measure of labor market entry. 
US Results 
We begin our analysis of the panel data by presenting evidence on the average effect of 
initial labor market conditions on criminal activity. In terms of the equations above, this 
corresponds to equation (1) that restricts the coefficient β to be the same across experience 
groups. Panel A of Table 1 shows the results for the US. The dependent variable is the log of 
the crime rate. Columns (1), (3) and (5) consider the national unemployment rate at labor 
market entry while columns (2), (4) and (6) use the state unemployment rate at labor market 
entry (our preferred specification). All regressions include year, state and age fixed effects and 
cohort composition variables. The national results control for a quadratic cohort trend while 
the state results include a full set of cohort fixed effects. The regressions are weighted by cell-
population and robust standard errors are clustered at the state-cohort level. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 show a strong positive estimated coefficient on the entry 
unemployment rate, whether we use the national or state-level variation in entry 
unemployment. For the state-level entry unemployment rate specification in column (2), the 
average arrest rate for a cohort entering the labor market in a recession is estimated to be around 
10.2 percent higher than for a similar cohort entering into a normal labor market (using a 5 
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percentage point increase in unemployment as a measure of recession relative to normal).14 The 
estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
This amounts to a substantial estimate of labor market entry effects on crime, but in some 
respects the average effect of recessions may not be the most relevant parameter of interest. 
Within a cohort, there will be a substantial share for which the marginal effect is zero, since 
their optimal decision will be unaffected – i.e. they are at an interior solution that results in no 
illegal behavior and the recession does not move them across the threshold. Thus the average 
effect that we estimate is a combination of a zero effect for potentially a large share of the 
cohort and a substantial effect for those close to the legal/illegal threshold in the absence of a 
recession. Indeed, the results from the analysis of the individual-level Census data presented in 
Section 5 below will suggest that this is the case, as the estimated entry-level unemployment 
effects are seen to be much larger for the less educated. The remaining columns show results 
for property crime and violent crime, using both national and state unemployment variation. 
The results suggest very similar and statistically significant effects in all cases. In all 
subsequent results, we report only those that use state-level unemployment rates as we view 
this as providing the most convincing identification.15  
                                                
14 We have used a five percentage points increase to measure a recession. This is in line with 
the scale of the unemployment rate increase in the Great Recession in the US, and also with 
the recessions seen in the UK over the whole period we analyse. However, this may be a little 
high for the US for pre-2000 recessions, where perhaps a 3 percentage point increase is a more 
appropriate magnitude of increase. Of course, the impact on the arrest rate would need to be 
scaled down by 3/5 for this recession size, so in the example here it would drop to 6.1 percent. 
15 We have also broken down property and violent crime into more disaggregated measures of 
crime types (breaking violent crime separately into murder, rape, assault and robbery and 
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As previously discussed, one may have potential concerns about inter-state mobility in 
the US data. More precisely, the presence of mobility raises the question of what is the correct 
(best measured) entry unemployment rate for cohort c at time t in state s? So far we have used 
the unemployment rate in state s at the time that cohort c left high-school. This ignores any 
mobility and if potential criminals move across state boundaries, this could be of concern. 
Some of those in cohort c at time t in state s will have completed high-school in state k and 
entered the labor market there. For this part of the cohort, the correct entry unemployment rate 
is of course the unemployment rate in state k at the time cohort c left high-school. Dahl (2002) 
makes the same point regarding estimates of state-specific earnings returns to education, which 
he shows differ substantially across states. His solution is to use reported migration flows 
across states to correct the estimated returns. We can follow broadly the same procedure here 
for the US, though such data is not available for the UK. We use the 5 percent US Census for 
1980, 1990 and 2000 and the 2010 ACS to calculate for each cohort c in state s the distribution 
of states-of-birth. Assuming that state-of-birth and state-at-16 are highly correlated, we 
generate a mobility-adjusted entry unemployment rate for cohort c in state s as: 
Ucs	=	 pcskUckKk=1  (5) 
where p is the proportion of cohort c in state s that were born in state k. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports estimates using this mobility-adjusted entry unemployment 
rate. The results are robust to the new specification, in that a positive and substantial entry-
level unemployment rate effect on crime remains. The effect tends to be slightly larger in 
                                                
property crime separately into burglary, larceny theft, vehicle theft and arson) and find there to 
be significant positive estimates of entry level unemployment rates for all crimes with the 
exception of murder. These results are in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
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magnitude (at 2.470 compared to 2.039 in Column (2)), but very much validates the earlier 
results. Hence, this robustness check offers a useful corroboration of our main results as, if 
anything, we appear to marginally underestimate the effect of initial unemployment at labor 
market entry on crime when we do not adjust for inter-regional mobility (although all the 
differences between mobility adjusted and non-adjusted estimates are not distinguishable from 
one another in terms of statistical significance). 
For the 1980-2000 time period, we also explored what happened to the entry-level 
unemployment rate on inclusion of the state-level “crack index” constructed by Fryer et al. 
(2013). The main results fully survived its inclusion and the crack index itself displayed a 
positive and significant relation with the arrest rate. 16  Thus the results remain robust to 
controlling for the crack prevalence index that has been shown to be a driver of US crime rates 
in the period that we study. 
UK Results 
The UK results are shown in Table 2. The only specification difference compared to the 
US results is that we allow cohort composition effects to have different coefficients in London 
compared to the rest of the UK. The differences in these estimated coefficients are statistically 
                                                
16 In fact, when the impact of the crack index was broken down into the sub-periods that Fryer 
et al. (2013) use – 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94 and 1995-2000 – we obtain similar estimates 
with the most important positive crime association being in 1985-89.   But the estimated 
coefficient on the entry-level unemployment rate was barely affected. For the 1980-2000 time 
period the estimated coefficient (standard error) on specifications comparable to column (2) of 
Table 1 were 1.156 (0.393) for the entry-level unemployment rate and 1.480 (0.557) for the 
mobility adjusted rate. On inclusion of the time varying crack index these respectively became 
1.155 (0.383) and 1.549 (0.548). 
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significant, suggesting that over time cohort composition and their effects on crime have 
differed substantially between London and the rest of the UK.17 
 We again find a statistically significant effect of entry unemployment on overall crime. 
Taking the estimated coefficient in Column (2), a recession that raises the (regional) 
unemployment rate by 5 percentage points would raise the lifetime conviction rate by 4 percent. 
We are somewhat skeptical about magnitudes when using national entry unemployment as the 
source of identification. The difficulty arises because we have to assume a specific functional 
form for the cohort effect whereas when regional entry unemployment is used we can non-
parametrically control for the cohort effect since identification comes from within-cohort 
variation across regions. To see the sensitivity of the results to this, note that the coefficient on 
national entry unemployment in column (1) of Table 2 is 2.664 (0.189) when we allow a 
quadratic cohort trend. If instead we allow a quartic cohort trend this coefficient drops to 1.007 
(0.189). We prefer to focus on the results that exploit within-cohort variation. 
Panel B of Table 2 focuses on whether all recessions are alike. A feature of the labor 
market common to European countries over the last forty years, but almost completely absent 
for the US (until the Great Recession), has been the incidence of long-term unemployment. We 
might expect, and the model of Mocan et al. (2005) predicts, that recessions characterized by 
rising rates of long-term unemployment would be much worse for potential scarring. Of course, 
                                                
17 An alternative would be to estimate the models using the regional dimension outside of 
London only. Results available on request show that this generates the same qualitative results 
as reported in the main text, though the precision tends to be somewhat higher. We prefer to 
include London and control directly for differences in the effect of cohort composition. Note 
that we do not allow for separate cohort effects for London, since this would remove any 
variation in entry unemployment for London. 
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initially a rising duration for the stock of currently unemployed is positive for new entrants 
since the stock of unemployed provides less competition for available vacancies, but we might 
expect this effect to be fleeting before the negative effects of unemployment duration on new 
entrants takes its toll. To examine this we divide the entry unemployment rate in the UK into 
the short-term and long-term unemployment rate. Short-term unemployment covers all those 
with a current unemployment spell of less than twelve months. For our entire sample, the 
average unemployment rate of 7.4 percent is made up of a short-term rate of 4.6 percent and a 
long-term rate of 2.8 percent. The results reported in Panel B show strongly that it is deep and 
long recessions characterized by high long-term unemployment that are particularly 
problematic. 
Dynamic Effects 
The specification used in Tables 1 and 2 implies that subsequent unemployment rates do 
not matter, or are at least orthogonal to the entry unemployment rate. There is no reason for 
this to be the case and so we follow the earnings study of Oreopoulos et al. (2012) in allowing 
for subsequent unemployment rates to affect our outcome of interest, crime, in addition to the 
entry rate. We do so by including the average unemployment rates for ages 19-21, 22-24 and 
25-27. In essence this means that for a particular cohort we allow for their crime path to be 
explained by both the unemployment experienced when entering the labor market and the 
unemployment rates they experience over the next 10 years.18 
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix present the results of this exercise. It is perhaps most 
useful to focus on column (3) where we allow for two changes, breaking the age 16-18 
                                                
18 We have also experimented with including unemployment rates prior to school-leaving age. 
Their additional inclusion leaves the positive and significant estimated impact of entry 
unemployment intact. 
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unemployment rate into its component parts and allowing for subsequent unemployment rates. 
On the first of these, when we allow for separate estimated effects for any individual year of 
unemployment, the estimates are imprecise. However, the p-value from a hypothesis test of the 
joint significance of the three individual year effects is significant at the 1 percent level. The 
reason is that there is a high degree of autocorrelation in the within-cohort unemployment 
rate.19 We therefore prefer to either use the age 16 effect alone (recognizing that it is picking 
up effects for age 17 and 18 as well) or use the three-year average. As columns (1) and (2) 
show, it matters little which we choose. The second key result of column (3) is that none of the 
subsequent three-year average unemployment rates that the cohort experiences has an 
individually significant effect on arrests. This helps us to better understand a puzzle in the 
literature that we referred to in the introduction: the overall link between crime and 
unemployment appears quite weak in many studies. Our results show that the key effect from 
unemployment on a cohort’s crime trajectory is the early experience of unemployment rather 
than the average unemployment experienced over the life-cycle. 
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrated a statistically significant and economically substantial effect 
of initial unemployment conditions on the arrest rates of cohorts over their entire lifetime. But 
we are also interested in the persistence of this. Is the entry unemployment effect primarily 
driven by a very large impact on crime in the early years after labor market entry that subsides 
as the young age and go on to establish a stable legal career? Or is the effect persistent, with 
some of those affected by harsh labor market conditions at labor market entry pushed into a 
criminal career that becomes self-perpetuating for the reasons discussed in Section 2? To study 
                                                
19  Appendix Figures A2 and A3 show this strong persistence in the autocovariances of 
unemployment rates within a cohort/state group for the US and UK, respectively.  
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this, we allow the coefficient on initial unemployment to vary by years since labor market entry 
as outlined in equation (3) of section 3.  
We group experience into four categories (0-5, 6-11, 12-17 and 18-21 years) and use an 
identical regression specification as in Table 1. Experience is set to 0 for ages 16 to 18. The 
results are shown in Tables 3 and 4 for the US and UK respectively, with columns (1) and (2) 
showing results for all crimes, and columns (3) and (4) for property and violent crime, 
respectively. Column (1) is estimated without controlling for subsequent unemployment 
whereas columns (2) to (4) allow for these effects interacted with experience dummies (i.e. 
equation (4)). There are strong positive effects of entry unemployment on arrests in the early 
years in the labor market, that fall as experience increases. However, even a decade after 
leaving school there remain significant positive effects from entry unemployment on crime 
rates. Juveniles who leave school in a recession have higher crime rates during their first few 
years in the labor market and higher crime rates over a decade later than juveniles who leave 
school in a buoyant economy. 
An alternative specification to examine the persistence of entry unemployment allows 
the interaction term with experience to vary with individual years of experience (rather than 
group experience as in Tables 3 and 4). Figures 1 and 2 plot the estimated coefficients (together 
with the 95 percent confidence intervals) for every year of labor market experience for the US 
and UK, respectively.20 Again, the drop in the effect after the first few years of labor market 
entry is clear, but the individual year estimates suggest a consistent longer lasting scarring 
effect for both countries.  
                                                
20  Figures A4 and A5 in the Appendix show the respective results when one allows 
unemployment rates later in life to enter the regression. The figures show patterns that are 
substantively the same. 
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5. Individual-Level Evidence 
Details of US Micro Data  
The micro-level data on US incarceration of individuals comes from US decennial 
Census and American Community Survey (ACS) data. We study all males aged 18-39 from 
the 5 percent samples of the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census and the 2008-2012 ACS from 
IPUMS-USA (the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series). We identify the institutionalized 
population using the Group Quarters variable contained in these data sources. However, only 
in the 1980 sample is the Group Quarters variable available at a detailed enough level to 
uniquely identify those in correctional facilities. In subsequent Censuses (and in the ACS), the 
institutionalized population includes the following additional categories: correctional facilities, 
nursing homes and mental hospitals, and juvenile institutions. Fortunately for our purposes, 
among the younger ages we focus upon, the share of the total institutionalized population 
accounted for by those in correctional facilities is very high in our sample (see Appendix Table 
A4 and its surrounding discussion in the Data Appendix on the validity of this). The additional 
covariates from the Census data include race, marital status, veteran status and education. 
Details of UK Micro Data  
Our micro-level data for the UK comes from the British Crime Survey (BCS). The BCS 
is a large (45,000 individuals) annual cross-section survey used to construct measures of crime 
victimization. Each year, a sub-sample of respondents is asked whether they have ever been 
arrested by the police. There is no information on the type of crime for which they were 
arrested, or on the eventual outcome. However, as we used conviction data in the UK panel 
analysis, it is useful to have an alternative counterpoint measure of criminal behavior (as in 
Lochner and Moretti, 2004) to evaluate robustness. We have a broad array of personal 
characteristics including education, ethnicity, marital status, housing status and employment 
and income.  
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US Results 
Panel A of Table 5 reports marginal effects from a probit regression on the Census 
incarceration data. We use state-at-birth to identify the state in which the individual went to 
school (Dahl, 2002) and so restrict the data to those born in the United States. Column (1) 
reports the results for the full sample of males aged 18-39 whilst the subsequent three columns 
focus on samples defined by educational attainment. All regressions include a full set of year, 
state of residence, state of birth and cohort effects, a quartic in age and controls for race, 
education, marital status and veteran status. 
The estimated coefficient on entry unemployment in column (1) is 0.038. The mean of 
the dependent variable is 0.030 (i.e. 3 percent of males aged 18-39 are incarcerated). Thus, 
entering the labor market in a time of recession (defined as the unemployment rate being 5 
percentage points higher than normal) results in a 6.3 percent increase in the probability of 
being incarcerated at the time of subsequent Census survey dates. However, we can see from 
the subsequent columns that this effect is almost entirely due to the high-school dropouts. A 
recession increases this group’s probability of incarceration by 6.6 percent, from an already 
high mean of 8.9 percent. These are sizeable effects taking into account that this is averaged 
over more than twenty years of the individual’s post-school experience. 
Finally, columns (3) and (4) show only weak effects for those who successfully graduate 
from high school and no effect at all for those with 4-years of college – who should of course 
not be affected by the unemployment rate at the compulsory school-leaving age. 21 The results 
                                                
21 To further examine the sensitivity of our results to mobility, we restricted the Census sample 
in Table 5 to include only those observations where the state of residence was the same as the 
state of birth. Re-estimating Table 5 with this restricted sample produces estimated coefficients 
(and associated standard errors) of 0.047 (0.024) and 0.161 (0.074) for the first two columns. 
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in Panel B show that redefining the 1980 measure of incarceration by explicitly excluding those 
not in correctional facilities (see the Data Appendix for discussion) does not alter the 
conclusions. This suggests that policy focused explicitly on the least educated during periods 
of high unemployment would likely reduce crime substantially more within that group than the 
average estimate from the previously reported panel regressions would imply. 
UK Results 
For the UK, we look at individual-level data on self-reported arrests. The data provide 
information on the age at which the respondent left full-time education and so allow us to 
precisely date the year of labor market entry. The data also provide an extensive set of personal 
characteristics, which we would expect to be correlated with criminal activity. There are two 
key disadvantages in using these micro data. First, there is the usual concern associated with 
the self-reporting of arrests. In the context of this study, however, this would only bias our 
estimates if the self-reporting probability varied within a cohort depending on the initial entry 
unemployment rate. It seems hard to us to make such a case. Second, we have no information 
of when the arrest occurred – the question is simply whether the individual has ever been 
arrested. That means that this data allows us to estimate the average impact of initial entry 
unemployment on the probability of being arrested in adulthood, but does not allow us to 
investigate the time pattern of the persistence of such effects. 
We estimate probit models with the dependent variable taking the value one if the 
respondent reports having ever been arrested by the police. We include survey year dummies 
and an extensive set of personal controls. Table 6 reports the results. Column (1) shows an 
estimated significant positive coefficient on the entry unemployment rate – a recession (again 
                                                
The coefficients in the final two columns remain small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant. 
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defined as a 5 percentage points higher than normal unemployment rate) is associated with a 
5.7 percent increase in the probability of ever being arrested.  
In the second column we restrict attention to those whose highest educational 
qualification was achieved at age 16 and therefore definitely left education at age 16. Here, we 
can more closely link the exit from education and the initial unemployment rate, which results 
in a sample that is likely to contain a larger fraction of individuals at risk of criminal behavior. 
As expected, we find a substantially larger and more significant impact of entry unemployment 
for this group – a recession raises the probability of ever being arrested by 8 percent.  
In the final column we conduct a placebo-type experiment. We examine the arrest record 
of individuals who report educational qualifications that require school attendance at least to 
age 18. This group should not have been directly affected by the unemployment rate when they 
were 16. Sure enough, we no longer find a positive effect for these individuals – indeed the 
estimated coefficient on the entry unemployment rate is indistinguishable from zero, though 
the standard error is large. 
Overall, then, the individual-level analysis of the relationship between crime and entry-
level unemployment produces results that are very similar to the cohort panel analysis of 
Section 4. This is true for both countries, despite some differences in the nature of the data that 
is available. The individual data permits us to study variations across individuals with different 
levels of education in more detail than the more macro cohort analysis which does not permit 
such differentiation. It is highly reassuring that the overall pattern of results are very consistent 
across the two. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have presented the first evidence that recessions can lead to substantial and persistently 
higher rates of criminal behavior among those likely to be most impacted by such conditions – 
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those newly entering the labor market. In contrast to much of the evidence on the long-run 
effect of initial unemployment on wages and career trajectories, we find that the effect on 
criminal behavior remains substantial, though attenuated, a number of years after labor market 
entry. These sizable and persistent entry level unemployment effects show that recessions can 
produce career criminals. One might argue that our results are also consistent with a one-time 
criminal event for individuals in a particular cohort that happens at different times since leaving 
school and that the probability of such a subsequent event could be higher if entry level 
unemployment were higher. Such a view would however be in conflict with two key empirical 
findings in the criminology literature, both of which are consistent with our interpretation of 
the results: late-onset offending is extremely rare and prolific offenders account for a 
disproportionate share of total crime.  
This evidence of a crime scarring effect from unemployment at the time of labor market 
entry emerges from empirical analysis of a range of different US and UK data sources, both at 
the level of the individual and from longitudinal analysis of age/birth cohorts over time. Whilst 
the reported effects are likely to be one factor amongst several that can plausibly explain the 
very sizable swings in youth criminality that have occurred in both countries in the past few 
decades, the evidence of crime scars does demonstrate a rather more disturbing long-run effect 
of recessions. In doing so, it also adds to the research picture that the state of the business cycle 
when people leave school and enter the labor market can have profound and sizable impacts 
on economic and social outcomes across their life.  
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Figure 1: Entry Unemployment Effects By Experience, US 
 
 
Notes: Derived from specification comparable to that in column (1) of Table 3, with 
separate estimates for each year of experience. 
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Figure 2: Entry Unemployment Effects By Experience, UK 
 
 
Notes: Derived from specification comparable to that in column (1) of Table 4,  
with separate estimates for each year of experience. 
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Table 1: US Cohort Panel Estimates, Basic Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Crime Type: All All Property Property Violent Violent 
Panel A       
National Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 1.550***  1.419*  1.871***  
 (0.506)  (0.732)  (0.519)  
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18  2.039***  2.115***  2.156*** 
  (0.443)  (0.598)  (0.524) 
Panel B       
Mobility Adjusted State Entry U   2.470***  2.016**  3.288*** 
Rate at Age 16-18  (0.609)  (0.771)  (0.776) 
State, Year & Age Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Quadratic Cohort Trend                                          x  x  x  
Cohort Fixed Effects  x  x  x 
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x 
Sample Size 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 
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Notes: Dependent variable is the log male arrest rate from the UCR. Sample runs from 1980-2010. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run from 
1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labor market between the age of 16 and 18. All insured unemployment rates are measured as the 
average unemployment rate at the three potential years of labor market entry. All regressions include year, age and state fixed effects. We include 
control variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, black men, married men and females per 
cohort in that state 1980-2010). Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the cohort-level national unemployment rate at labor market entry and include 
a cohort quadratic trend. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include cohort-level state unemployment rates and include cohort fixed effects. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered at the state-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the male cell-population. * indicates significance at the 10 
percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.  
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Table 2: UK Cohort Panel Estimates, Basic Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Crime Type: All All Property Property Violent Violent 
Panel A        
National Entry U Rate at Age 16 2.664*** 
(0.189) 
  3.443*** 
(0.249) 
 0.803*** 
(0.191) 
 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16  0.811*** 
(0.277) 
 0.712** 
(0.350) 
 1.531*** 
(0.365)         
Panel B       
Region Entry Short-Term U Rate at 
Age 16 
 -1.188* 
(0.620) 
 -1.008 
(0.767) 
 -1.074 
(0.933)         
Region Entry Long-Term U Rate at 
Age 16 
 1.687*** 
(0.372) 
 1.466*** 
(0.474) 
 2.673*** 
(0.464)       
Region, Year & Age Fixed Effects x x x x x x 
Quadratic Cohort Effect x  x  x  
Cohort Fixed Effects  x  x  x 
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Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x 
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log male conviction rate from the OID/PNC. Sample runs from 1980-2010. Individual year-of-birth 
cohorts run from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labor market at age 15/16. All unemployment rates are measured in year 
of labor market entry. We include control variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, 
nonwhite men and married men in each cohort/region, 1980-2010), allowing for differential effects of composition in London. All 
regressions include year, age, and region fixed effects. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include the cohort-level national unemployment rate at 
labor market entry and include a cohort quadratic trend. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include cohort-level region unemployment rates and 
include cohort fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the region-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the 
male cell-population. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates 
significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3: US Cohort Panel Estimates, Effects by Labor Market Experience Groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Crime Type: All All Property Violent 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(0-5) 3.609*** 3.290*** 1.481** 5.151*** 
 (0.626) (0.702) (0.717) (1.124) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(6-11) 1.926*** 1.705*** 0.965 2.615*** 
 (0.535) (0.617) (0.737) (0.821) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(12-17) 1.475*** 1.558** 2.151** 0.883 
 (0.556) (0.643) (0.911) (0.752) 
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18*Exp(18-21) 1.515*** 2.421*** 3.345*** 2.032** 
 (0.566) (0.707) (0.959) (0.859) 
State, Year, Cohort & Age Fixed Effects x x x x 
Compositional adjustment x x x x 
Allowing for subsequent U rates - x x x 
Sample Size 19,429 19,429 19,429 19,429 
Notes: As for columns (2), (4) and (6) specifications of Panel A, Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 4: UK Cohort Panel Estimates, Effects by Labor Market Experience Groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All All Property Violent 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(0-5)      0.861***      0.967***       0.972***  1.034* 
 (0.305) (0.316) (0.362) (0.532) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(6-11)       0.913***       0.970***      1.050***     0.996** 
 (0.284) (0.298) (0.365) (0.444) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(12-17)     0.832**     0.809** 0.733      1.369*** 
 (0.343) (0.358) (0.448) (0.435) 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16*Exp(18-23) 0.582 0.529 0.124       2.701*** 
 (0.369) (0.405) (0.502) (0.504) 
Region, Year, Cohort & Age Fixed Effects x x x x 
Compositional Adjustment x x x x 
Subsequent U-Exp Interactions  x x x 
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 
Notes: As for columns (2), (4) and (6) specifications of Panel A, Table 2. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
42 
 
Table 5: US Individual Level Estimates, Census/ACS Incarceration Regressions, 1980-2010 
 
Sample: 
(1) 
All Males 
(2) 
HS Dropouts 
(3) 
HS Grads 
(4) 
4yr College 
A. Aged 18 And Over     
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 0.038** 
(0.018) 
0.117* 
(0.063) 
0.023 
(0.030) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
B. Aged 18 And Over, 1980 Redefined     
State Entry U Rate at Age 16-18 0.035* 
(0.018) 
0.130** 
(0.062) 
0.016 
(0.030) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Year, State & Cohort Effects x x x x 
State/Race Effects x x x x 
State of Birth Effects x x x x 
Age Quartic x x x x 
Sample Size 5,759,537 798,546 2,552,973 1,164,030 
Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects from a probit where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is 
institutionalized and 0 otherwise. Sample covers males aged 18-39 who are not in school, and born in the United States. Entry 
unemployment is the unemployment rate at age 16 in the state of birth. Data are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 5 percent IPUMS US 
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Census and the 2008-2012 IPUMS ACS. Regressions also include marital status, race, education and veteran status indicators. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the state/cohort level and regressions are weighted with the Census person weight. * indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 6: UK Self Report Arrest Regressions, 2001/2 to 2010/11 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ever Arrested Ever Arrested, 
Age 16 
Qualification 
Ever Arrested, 
Age 18+ 
Qualification 
Region Entry U Rate at Age 16     0.259**       0.543*** 0.055 
 (0.125) (0.166) (0.207) 
Year Dummies x x x 
Personal Controls x x x 
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.216 0.288 0.153 
Sample Size 22,281 7,849 9,006 
Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects from a probit where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual 
reports having ever been arrested and 0 otherwise. Personal controls include age (10 categories), ethnic group (5 categories), education 
(9 categories where appropriate), student status, marital status (4 categories), income (18 categories), economic status (15 categories), 
number of children (10 categories), housing tenure (8 categories), years at address (9 categories), years in area (9 categories), and 
government office region (10 categories). The sample covers ages 16 to 65 of pooled British Crime Surveys, 2001-2002 to 2010-2011. 
Regressions use individual sample weights. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the government office region level. * indicates 
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significance at the 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level, *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
